A substantial portion of the costs associated with, and the value to beneficiaries of, Social Security Disability Insurance is Medicare eligibility. However, the benefits of this eligibility can vary due to differences in state policies on supplemental Medicare coverage, also known as Medigap. Although Medigap policies are federally regulated to be issued to 65-and-over Medicare beneficiaries with specific restrictions over underwriting, these policies are left to states to regulate with regard to the under-65 SSDI population, generating substantial cross-state and temporal variation. This paper documents the variation in availability and generosity of under-65 Medigap eligibility for the SSDI population. Furthermore, it exploits this variation to provide initial estimates of how this eligibility affects the health status of nonMedicaid-eligible SSDI recipients. Our main finding is that requiring Medigap plans be offered for under-65 SSDI recipients substantially improves self-reported health of this population, with suggestive evidence that this improvement is stronger as underwriting restrictions increase and among SSDI beneficiaries with mental health conditions. The estimated effect is highly robust to alternative scaling or categorizations of self-reported health, choice of data set, inclusion of fixed effects, controls for local Medicare Advantage penetration, and falsification tests. This effect is nearly three times the size of the estimated increase in self-reported health in the Oregon Medicaid expansion.
Introduction
A substantial portion of the costs associated with, and the value to beneficiaries of, Social Security Disability Insurance is Medicare eligibility. SSDI recipients are the vast majority of under-65 Medicareeligible population in the US, 1 and while previous work has focused on behavior and outcomes during the two-year waiting period between cash benefit and Medicare eligibility or the effects of eliminating this waiting period, there is much less research on the impact of differences in Medicare coverage itself, including private supplemental coverage (Medigap) and Medicare Advantage (MA). These differences arise from two sources: first, although the over-65 Medicare population faces federally required
guaranteed issuance and open and special enrollment periods limiting underwriting, Medigap policies for under-65 SSDI recipients depend on state regulations; and second, the availability of managed care options through Medicare Advantage and Special Needs Plans (SNPs), also varies dramatically from market to market. This paper documents the variation in availability and generosity of cost-sharing Medigap options, then uses this variation to provide new evidence of the impact of the structure of health care coverage on health for this population.
There is a long history of estimating the effects of health insurance coverage on a range of outcomes, including health service usage, health status, mortality, and labor market outcomes. Measuring these effects is of central policy interest, given that over a quarter of the US federal budget is dedicated to
Medicare and Medicaid, and numerous government programs insure or directly provide health care for certain subpopulations. But an early and consistent finding in in this literature was a lack of evidence of a positive effect of health insurance coverage on health outcomes on average (e.g., Newhouse et al. 1993 , Finkelstein and McKnight 2008 , Baicker et al. 2013 ; see Levy and Meltzer 2008 and Rutledge 2016 for reviews). Although many of these studies find a substantial monetary welfare benefit due to increased coverage, the average newly covered individual experienced little detectable gain in health or work capacity.
This lack of an average effect on health and work outcomes belies the potential importance of coverage for vulnerable subpopulations, including the elderly, low-income groups, those with chronic health conditions, and those seeking behavioral health services (Dow et al. 1997 , Card, Dobkins, and Maestas 2009 , Andersen 2015 . One particular subpopulation for which we would expect positive benefits of health coverage is the long-term disabled, especially given recent quasi-experimental evidence that larger SSDI cash benefits decrease beneficiary mortality (Gelber et al. 2018) . Despite Medicare eligibility after two years of SSDI cash benefit eligibility, there are a limited number of prior studies on the role of Medicare in the health of this population. This prior work primarily identifies the effect of health insurance using the two-year waiting period between Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) cash-benefit eligibility and Medicare eligibility (Riley 2006 , Livermore et al. 2009 , and Michalopoulous et al. 2011 . However, limited follow-up periods and lack of variation in anything but the timing of eligibility naturally limit the policy margins for which conclusions can be drawn. As a result, we know little about how the disabled population's health and work capacity is affected by health insurance coverage, and even less about how structural differences in this coverage could translate into differential health effects.
This study presents a preliminary analysis of the impact in varying access to Medicare supplemental coverage on the health of the SSDI population. It exploits cross-state and temporal variation in these measures, most notably state-level changes in required Medigap issuance for the under-65
Medicare population, and draws on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate the impact of such required Medigap issuance and limitations on underwriting on the self-reported health of the long-term disabled population. Although the data in question allow for only estimation of the impact of Medigap policies on this measure of health, self-reported health has been shown to provide an independent explanatory component to a range of health outcomes. Most notably, those reporting poor health have twice to four times the estimated mortality odds ratios (Idler and Benyamini 1997) .
Furthermore, self-reported health is likely to be more sensitive to changes in quality of life, morbidity severity, and functional impairments than mortality measures (Levy and Meltzer 2008) .
There are two direct policy implications for exploring the effect of the structure of Medicare benefits on the SSDI population. First, since the role of government in the health care sector continues to be an actively discussed area of policymaking, understanding the subpopulations most likely to be helped or hurt by changes in government-provided insurance coverage, by how much, and by which insurance structures, directly informs these discussions. Second, the SSDI population is large and diverse, with approximately 9 million disabled workers and millions more dependents and survivors (SSA 2016), so understanding the health needs and work capacity responses to the structure of health insurance coverage can provide insight as to how to optimally design this program and its benefit structure going forward.
Social Security Disability Insurance and Medicare Eligibility
In addition to retirement benefits, the Social Security Administration provides disability coverage for workers in the US. Coverage and benefit level is determined by prior Social Security-taxable wages, but benefit eligibility requires a health condition or set of health conditions expected to last for at least 12 months or result in death, and which prevent earning at a Substantial Gainful Activity level ($1,180 per month in 2018). The application process can be lengthy, with many stages of potential appeal if rejected, and requires de facto labor force exit. If determined to be disabled, individuals are entitled to monthly cash benefits five calendar months after their disability established onset date. Twenty-four months after initial monthly cash benefit entitlement, SSDI beneficiaries gain eligibility for Medicare coverage.
However, on its own, fee-for-service Medicare carries with it a range of deductibles and a 20% coinsurance rate for physician expenditures. Additionally, there is no lifetime out-of-pocket maximum.
As such, most Medicare beneficiaries purchase or otherwise obtain supplemental coverage, via Medicaid, Medigap, Medicare Advantage, employer-provided plans, VA health benefits, or TRICARE. However, this supplemental coverage differs across type of Medicare beneficiary: in 2012, nearly 90% of over-65
Medicare beneficiaries had supplemental coverage, while under 80% of the under-65 Medicare population had supplemental coverage (Cubanski 2016) . Due to the relatively lower assets and income of this population, the SSDI population has historically been substantially more likely to be eligible for Medicaid benefits, with 35% of the under-65 Medicare population being dually enrolled in Medicaid compared to 10% of the over-65 Medicare population.
For the non-dual-eligible SSDI beneficiaries, the focus of this paper, the alternative sources of supplemental coverage are employer-sponsored insurance (minimal for this group due to the work restrictions for SSDI eligibility), Medicare Advantage, and Medigap supplemental insurance. These latter two options, although accounting for nearly half of the over-65 Medicare population's supplemental insurance (31% MA and 17% Medigap in 2012), have a different structure for the disabled population;
while a similar proportion of the under-65 Medicare population have MA (27%), only 2% have Medigap (Cubanski 2016) .
Medigap
Medigap insurance arose to meet the demand for wrap-around coverage for extra expenses not covered by Medicare, with the plans' coverage characteristics federally standardized in 1990. Appendix Table 1 shows the standardized plan designs for plans A through N; beneficiaries pay a monthly premium to enroll in a particular plan. An insurer need not offer every plan type, but if it offers any, it must offer a Plan A and either a Plan C or Plan F, although these requirements apply only to plans offered to the over-65 population. Due to its extensive coverage, Plan F is the most popular Medigap plan, accounting for over 50% of Medigap enrollees (Starc 2014 
Medicare Advantage
Individuals who are eligible for Medicare may opt to gain coverage through a private plan chosen in the Medicare Advantage (MA) market, many of which charge no additional premium for enrollment.
Although they offer more supplemental coverage, like Medigap, and are underwritten only by service area, the tradeoff faced by beneficiaries selecting an MA plan is that most of these plans are managed care plans or bundle Part D prescription drug plans with formulary limitations. Hence, they restrict enrollees to a particular network of doctors and require referrals for specialists, as well as potentially limit covered prescription drugs.
Additionally, insurers may offer Special Needs Plans (SNPs) in select counties or states; SNPs can be one of three varieties based on the eligible population: those with chronic health conditions, those dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare, or institutionalized populations. Although there are a range of chronic health condition categories that chronic health condition SNPs (C-SNPs) can offer eligibility to, insurers are free to limit eligibility to a subset of these conditions, in some cases focusing the SNP on one specific type of health condition. Since we generally exclude Medicaid dual-eligibles in our analysis to avoid conflation of cross-state differences and changes in Medicaid policy with Medicare coverage options, 4 and the institutionalized population is not included in the sampling frame of our data, we focus here on C-SNPs, which are of particular applicability to the long-term disabled SSDI population as well.
A recent spate of research has exploited variation in the availability and generosity of Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, private managed care plans offered by insurers to all Medicare beneficiaries in a particular coverage area, for the over-65 Medicare population Layton 2015, Cabral et al. 2014) . Although the original introduction of SNPs was accompanied with pilot program evaluations and observational comparisons in plan quality (Cromwell et al. 2008; Maciejewski et al. 2011) , there is no research that we are aware of that examines the impact of MA plans, and specifically the availability and generosity of SNPs, on the health market outcomes of the SSDI population.
The central difficulty in estimating the impact of MA and MA SNP availability on health outcomes is the endogeneity of these plans' being offered. Not every county or state has every SNP, and the introduction of a particular chronic condition SNP, for example one for diabetes, may be responding to increasing rates of diabetes in the population. In this analysis, we do not attempt to estimate the causal relationship between the availability of MA and MA SNPs on health outcomes, although as a robustness check, we control for prior years' availability of these plans in order to control for alternative supplemental options that would affect those potentially considering purchasing a Medigap policy. We Medical Expenses/Utilization of Health Care. This module elicited detailed information on medical costs and usage of the health care system. In this analysis, we focus on the five-point self-reported health measure, which varies from 1 for "Excellent" to 5 for "Poor." In this analysis, we follow the Ware et al.
(2002) rescaling of this measure, 7 as these authors' scaling analyses suggest that these categorizations do not represent equal differences in self-rated health. Tables 6 and 7 present results using alternative categorizations of these health variables, with broadly similar findings.
Although there are approximately 105,000 respondents in the 2008 SIPP, we limit our analytic sample to only those respondents in each of these interview waves who were:
1) Current recipients of Social Security income for a disability in at least one month of the current wave 2) Aged 21 to 64 3) Currently covered by Medicare in at least one month of the current wave 4) Not covered by Medicaid in any of the months of the current wave These restrictions limit the sample to 1,586 unique individuals. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of this group. Not surprisingly given their status as SSDI beneficiaries, their health tends to be at the poor end of the spectrum, with nearly two thirds reporting either Poor or Fair health. We construct a measure of whether the same individual reports the same or better health as in the last topical module to allow for comparability with Baicker et al. (2013) . This measure excludes all those who reported "Poor" health in the prior wave, since mechanically such individuals would always have an outcome of one. This measure shows that the majority of respondents maintain or improve their health between interviews. This under-65 Medicare population is also relatively old for this age window, with an average age of 54.44.
Nearly two-thirds of respondents reside in a state with a requirement for insurers to issue at least Medicare beneficiaries for whom we observe self-reported health before and after such a change.
Analysis
Our analytic approach is weighted least squares, using the person-level probability weights from the SIPP. The most common specification we fit is: There is a 0.193 increase in the five-point health measure, representing an average improvement of approximately a fifth of a point, or one in five beneficiaries reporting a one point improvement in selfreported health. 9 Columns 5 and 6 include measures of lagged Medicare Advantage enrollment and for whether that state had enrollment in one of the three types of C-SNPs shown in Figure 2 in the prior year, but this inclusion has little statistically significant impact on the estimate.
Column 7 includes not just the overall under-65 guaranteed issue requirement, but also the additional types of Medigap regulation; it is worth noting that changes in these types of regulation occurred only when the guaranteed issuance requirement changed. Nevertheless, the overall coefficient shows that guaranteed issuance improves health even more. However, having an open enrollment period requirement mitigates this effect. This finding may initially seem counterintuitive, but such an open enrollment period without premium rating regulations may limit the affordability of such plans to the under-65 population. Indeed, the coefficient estimate for states with the strongest premium rating restriction -under-65 Medicare beneficiaries must be charged the same premium as over-65 beneficiaries -the effect on improved health is even stronger, if only marginally statistically significant. Finally, Column 8 estimates the health impact including individual-level fixed effects, thereby absorbing many potentially confounding selection effects. The estimate, albeit noisier, is statistically indistinguishable from our preferred specification in Column 4.
Our overall conclusion from these regressions is that states requiring Medigap insurers to offer at least one Medigap plan to the under-65 Medicare population measurably and substantially improves this population's self-reported health. This improvement is consistent across a range of specifications and appears even stronger in the presence of additional regulations limiting premium underwriting, although inference of these regulations is limited by the sample window in question. But to test the robustness and incidence of our findings, Tables 5 and 6 presents estimates by subpopulation, an alternative data set, and over populations which should not be directly affected by under-65 Medigap policies.
Column 1 in Table 5 presents results from our preferred specification (Column 4 in Table 4 ) for the purposes of comparison. Column 2 provides a separate interacted marginal effect by sex, indicating that the improved health effect is stronger for male SSDI beneficiaries. Column 3 provides estimates of interactions with type of health condition reported by the SIPP respondent: the improved health effect is even stronger among those with mental health conditions. 10 Given the relative paucity of mental or behavioral health-specific SNPs and historical restrictions in Medicare coverage of mental-health-related care (Donohue et al. 2009 , Busch et al. 2016 , affordable Medigap policies may be of particular use for SSDI beneficiaries with mental health conditions. Column 4 provides four robustness checks: given that the within-state variation in Medigap coverage arises from only four states, we conduct four separate 10 Although the absolute value of the combined effect for those with a heart condition or diabetes indicates a worsening of health for these groups, this combined effect is not statistically significantly different from zero.
estimates dropping each of these states to determine whether the estimated effect is driven by just a single state and potential confounding idiosyncrasies of such a state. The estimated effect remains highly statistically significant and is statistically unchanged from the estimate shown in Column 1. Table 5 therefore shows that there is not a single state driving the estimated effect, and that this effect is strongest among male SSDI beneficiaries and those beneficiaries reporting a mental health condition. Table 6 provides further robustness and falsification tests. Columns 3 through 7 all use the same Ware-rescaled self-reported health measure from Tables 4 and 5 , with Column 3 reporting the result from the same regression as in Column 4 of Table 4 and Column 1 of Table 5 . Columns 1 and 2 show estimates based on different rescalings of the self-reported health measure: Column 1 shows the effect from a lack of any scale, preserving the 1 (Excellent) to 5 (Poor) health metric, and providing a nearly identical effect on health as the Ware-rescaled estimate. Column 2 provides an estimate with the Diehr et al. (2000) rescaling, from 15 for Poor, 30 for Fair, 80 for Good, 90 for Very Good, and 95 for Excellent. Although noisier (the Diehr rescaling leads a strongly bimodal rescaling of the self-reported health distribution), the estimated impact is still statistically significant. Furthermore, the estimated change from our preferred specification in Column 3 is 3.9% of the maximum health value in the Ware et al. (2002) and, in the absence of health spillovers, there should be no effect of state under-65 Medigap regulation on this group. Although we find a positive point estimate of the Medigap guaranteed issuance requirement on the health of this population, this estimate is markedly smaller than our prior estimate, and is not nearly statistically significant. Furthermore, estimates of state Medigap policy on the non-Medicare adult population are virtually zero. Both these estimates suggest that the estimated effect is due to the state Medigap policy under question and is not being driven by other unobservable trends.
Finally, we test whether our results are being driven specifically by the SIPP data set. We draw upon the cross-sectional CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (i.e., the "March CPS" or CPS ASEC) which contains self-reported health, SSDI receipt, age, state, Medicare coverage, and Medicaid coverage. Because it is limited in measures of disabling health conditions and is cross-sectional (and thus does not allow for including individual fixed effects, as in Table 4 , Column 8, and does not allow for estimates of improvements in health as reported in Table 7 which enables comparison to health estimates from other studies), we prefer the SIPP as our primary data set.
However, it does have more years of observation, and thus more states' changes in guaranteed issuance policy, and Column 6 shows the estimated impact from 2004 to 2013. We find a statistically similar improvement in health, albeit with a smaller point estimate, in states with Medigap guaranteed issuance policies for the under-65 Medicare population, following the same state-and year-fixed-effects approach as in our preferred SIPP specification. However, as discussed above, there were substantial policy changes to Medicare in the mid-2000s, including the introduction of Part D (and as a result, the removal of prescription drug coverage from Medigap plans). Column 7 presents the estimate for the same years used in the SIPP analysis; the estimated improvement of 0.182 health points is remarkably similar to the SIPP estimate of 0.193, and statistically indistinguishable. Table 6 suggests that our results are not dependent on any specific SIPP-related issues, and our estimated health improvement passes the falsification tests, providing null estimates on untreated groups over the same time period. Furthermore, our results are not dependent on the rescaling of the self-reported health measure.
We next turn to estimates based on the binary categorization of the self-reported health measure, a common transformation of self-reported health (Manor, Matthews, and Power 2000) . Table 7 Although the impact on the first outcome variable -reporting poor or fair health -is small (approximately a 3-percentage point reduction in the least squares and probit average marginal effects specifications) and not statistically significant, the majority of SSDI beneficiaries report being in one of these two categories, and medical recovery among this population is generally rare (SSA 2016) . Limiting the analysis on the likelihood of reporting poor health, we estimate a decline of approximately 9
percentage points across both the least squares and probit marginal effects specifications, both highly significant. Since the sample average is 20%, this effect is sizable. These two findings -a small, statistically insignificant reduction in reporting poor or fair health and large, highly significant reduction in reporting poor health -suggests that much of the estimated improvement in self-reported health of the under-65 Medigap guaranteed issuance policy is in moving respondents from poor to fair health.
For the impact on same or improved health, the estimated effect is approximately [19] [20] percentage points across the least squares and probit specifications, nearly three times the size of the estimate from Baicker et al. (2013) . Although this measure is constructed differently and limits its sample to those not reporting poor health, who, the prior analyses suggest, likely experience the largest health improvement, this estimate indicates that the impact of state-level Medigap policy on the health of the under-65 Medicare population is large relative to other health insurance expansion margins, especially
given Medigap is a supplemental insurance policy.
Conclusion
This study examines the impact of state-level regulation of Medigap policies for under-65 Medicare beneficiaries on these beneficiaries' health. The overall finding is that when states require insurers to issue Medigap plans to under-65 Medicare beneficiaries, their self-reported health is substantially higher.
This result is robust to alternative specifications and data sets, as well as to a range of falsification tests and robustness checks. This effect is strongest for men, those with mental health conditions, and states that also regulate the premiums that can be charged to under-65 Medicare beneficiaries.
However, future analyses may provide additional detail as to relevant mechanisms. Currently, the inclusion of recent enrollment in MA and SNP plans as controls do not statistically impact our central findings, but policy induced variation in these plans may uncover additional margins for health impacts Layton 2015, Cabral et al. 2014 ).
Finally, although the SIPP data is publicly available, contains repeated health measures, elicits SSDI, SSI, Medicare, and Medicaid coverage, and has geographic identifiers, it was not designed as a health survey and does not elicit information on the type of Medicare supplementation beneficiaries have.
Future research will include drawing on the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey to measure how state policies and changes in MA and C-SNP availability change enrollment, utilization, and health, especially for the populations potentially most affected by the availability and affordability of Medicare supplementary options, such as those with chronic mental health conditions.
Overall, the size and robustness of the estimated effect indicates that the SSDI Medicare population's health is very sensitive to even supplemental coverage; that is, the policy variation in question is over the remaining 20% coinsurance and insurance products that limit this cost sharing. Ware et al. (2002) . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
